The Northern Mariana Islands and the Aleutian Islands: Forgotten pillars of the US Indo-Pacific strategy

By Aayush Gandhi

As the Chinese threat against Taiwan rapidly increases, new US Indo-Pacific strategies have emphasized the creation of a grid of small, dispersed, and concealed bases to strengthen deterrence. Proponents have called for the US to increase the number of bases and enhance collaboration with allied nations (Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to achieve this.  

However, relying on allies may prove difficult due to domestic resistance (of allies), the weakening of some alliances, and other geopolitical factors. But one solution is often overlooked: the construction of bases on US Pacific territories such as the Northern Mariana Islands or the Aleutian Islands. 

Allied uncertainty and the status quo threat to US forward presence 

Access to key bases, especially in allied nations near Taiwan, will prove critical to the US Indo-Pacific deterrent. However, many of the US’s allies are hesitant to get drawn into a US-China conflict, complicating the US presence. For example, South Korea has considerable resistance to increasing US forces to deter China, not North Korea. Even if Washington might convince Seoul, China can still weaponize South Korea’s economic dependence to change the decision-making calculus, as it happened before in 2016.  

Similarly, in the Philippines, despite the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and considerable public support for the US, there is a large amount of uncertainty since the Philippines has stated it will not allow the US to use bases to counter a Taiwan invasion. At the same time, the presence of “a vocal anti-US coalition of politicians and elites” further complicates relations.  

However, US military bases in Japan will prove the most critical for US operations, power projection, and logistics in a possible conflict. Similar to South Korea and the Philippines, however, there are limiting factors. US presence on Okinawa Island, the closest to Taiwan—home to more than half of US troops in Japan, and a critical hub for any US air operation in the region—faces widespread public opposition amongst Okinawans. Since one primary reason is the fear of being targeted in the event of a conflict, there is a considerable amount of risk that the US would be unable to use the islands if Taiwan is invaded. Other factors, such as the Japanese interpretation of the “Status of Force Agreement” requiring Japanese consultation for US forces and the prohibition of a joint US-Japanese military command, can hurt the US operationally.  

The promise of the CNMI and Aleutian

A rapid military buildup of not only Guam but the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI) and key Aleutian Islands can alleviate concerns associated with alliance uncertainty while strengthening US power projection in the Indo-Pacific. Among the US Pacific Islands, Guam has received considerable investment for a new missile defense system, the construction of a new Marine Corps base, and troop deployments. However, this choice makes little sense in the context of a growing Chinese threat. The overwhelming size of China’s ballistic missile arsenal can easily neutralize a possible US response, even after potential defense upgrades. While the US should continue to strengthen Guam to deter China, especially with passive defenses, it shouldn’t make Guam the only location for US power, but rather a part of it.  

Building up capabilities in NMI brings numerous benefits. First, by dispersing US forces away from Guam instead of concentrating them there, it raises the amount of resources China must invest to attack the US, discouraging a Chinese strike and allowing the US to detect a Chinese invasion force more readily. Second, since NMI is a chain of islands, placing troops there can assist in building a rapid-response and flexible force posture while helping to camouflage US assets (aircraft, submarines, drones, etc). If one runway is damaged, for instance, the US can use another island to launch bombers against China.  

The Aleutian Islands hold a similar promise. Since the Aleutian Islands are outside the Second Island Chain but still somewhat close to Japan and China, they can serve as a critical logistical hub for US naval forces and air squadrons in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, given China’s growing threat to US interests in the Arctic, the buildup of the Aleutian Islands can also strengthen deterrence in that region as well. Yet, the island chain’s capabilities must be significantly improved to serve US interests.  

The road ahead 

Investments in the Northern Mariana Islands and the Aleutian Islands will prove critical to fulfilling a grand strategy predicated upon dispersed and smaller bases. While these bases might not be as valuable as bases in Japan and the Philippines, the possible risks posed to US forces from a denial of operations or access warrant the need for a ‘Plan B.’